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EVEN I CAN’T COVER ME: EXAMINING THE NCAA’S  
EFFECTIVE PROHIBITION ON “LOSS OF VALUE”  
INSURANCE FOR ITS STUDENT-ATHLETES  
 
MICHAEL D. RANDALL* 
 
*** 
This Note analyzes the NCAA’s effective prohibition on student-
athletes exploring outside insurance to cover the loss of value of their 
athletic talents.  Currently, the vast majority of collegiate athletes are only 
permitted to obtain insurance for career-ending injuries.  Existing NCAA 
Bylaws serve to effectively prevent these individuals from protecting 
themselves against value or earnings potential-reducing injuries.  This 
situation is of particular concern because of the importance and 
prevalence of intercollegiate athletics as a (sometimes mandatory) step 
toward a career in professional sports.  This Note examines the NCAA’s 
current insurance structure and the rationales for this system, which 
includes an effective prohibition against obtaining loss of value insurance 
to guard against losses in earnings.  It then explores why this bar should be 
lifted and how current student-athletes could mount a challenge, as well as 
possible remedies and the implications of a successful challenge.  Finally, 
it discusses how the NCAA and its member institutions could go about 
implementing a loss of value insurance program, should they choose or be 
required to do so, and what concerns would arise. 
*** 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The debate over the exploitation of college athletes has carried on 
for decades.  Athletes, administrators, school presidents, parents, and 
countless other invested parties have wrestled over whether athletes are 
adequately compensated for their financial contributions to their schools.  
Supporters of compensating athletes contend that these young men and 
women put their bodies (and future livelihoods) at risk to earn millions of 
dollars for their institutions.  Opponents contend that these athletes are 
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already compensated with a “free ride” in the form of an athletic 
scholarship and the opportunity to showcase their talents on a national 
stage. 
While there may soon be a legal conclusion to this debate,1 athletes 
are further harmed when they are denied the opportunity to protect 
themselves against future losses.  Though the National Collegiate Athletic 
Association (hereinafter “NCAA”) currently provides medical and 
disability insurance to all of its athletes, coaches, managers, trainers, and 
cheerleaders,2 it does not provide loss-of-value-insurance.3 Though there is 
an extra coverage policy available to a select portion of athletes,4 it too only 
covers permanent total disability.  Thereby, the vast majority of individuals 
do not have access to benefits that would protect them should they suffer an 
injury that only impairs their athletic ability.   
Many of the arguments that apply in the student-athlete 
compensation debate are also pertinent to a discussion of loss of value 
benefits.  Since many American professional sports leagues require athletes 
to wait anywhere from one5 to three years6 after completing their high 
                                                                                                                                
1 See generally O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 
955 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2014), appeals filed, No. 14-16601 (9th Cir. Aug. 21, 
2014), No. 14-17068 (Oct. 21, 2014). 
2 See Student-Athlete Insurance Programs, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/ 
about/resources/insurance/student-athlete-insurance-programs (last visited May 20, 
2015) [hereinafter “NCAA Insurance Programs”]. 
3 Zach Schonbrun, Injury Raises Questions About Insurance for College Stars, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/15/sports/ncaa 
basketball/injury-to-nerlens-noel-raises-questions-about-disability-insurance-for-
athletes.html?_r=0. 
4 See NCAA Insurance Programs, supra note 2. 
5 Per a rule instituted in 2005, in order for an individual to be eligible for the 
National Basketball Association (hereinafter “NBA”) draft, he must be at least 19 
years old “during the calendar year in which the Draft is held” and, if the player is 
not an international player, “at least one (1) NBA Season has elapsed since the 
player’s graduation from high school.” NBA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
AGREEMENT art. X, § 1(b)(i) (2011), available at http://nbpa.com/cba/; see also 
O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 967–68 (discussing how basketball recruits are 
effectively forced to play for NCAA programs because they cannot enter the NBA 
out of high school). 
6 There are similar rules concerning athletes’ eligibility for the National 
Football League (herein after “NFL”) and Major League Baseball (hereinafter 
“MLB”) drafts which, in certain circumstances, require athletes to wait at least 
three years after completing their high school degree in order to become draft-
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school degree before they are eligible to turn pro, these individuals, 
depending on their sport, are automatically deprived of potential earning 
capacity.  The lack of comparable alternative options to college athletics 
effectively forces these individuals to play collegiate sports if they have 
any hopes of pursuing a professional career.7 Should an athlete choose to 
forego playing his sport after high school until he is draft-eligible, he would 
presumably see his draft position reduced due to a perceived loss in ability, 
potential, talent, and missed opportunities for growth and development in 
the eyes of the professional teams he is hoping to join.8 This process has 
                                                                                                                                
eligible. The rule instituted by the NFL mandates that athletes wait at least three 
years after high school before they may enter the draft. NFL COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING AGREEMENT art. 6, § 2(b) (2011), available at 
http://images.nflplayers.com/mediaResources/files/PDFs/General/2011_Final_CB
A_Searchable_Bookmarked.pdf. The MLB rule provides athletes with a choice: 
they may either declare themselves eligible for the draft immediately out of high 
school, or, if they decide to attend college, they must then complete, in order to 
become draft-eligible, either their junior year if attending a four-year college or at 
least one year if attending junior college. First-Year Player Draft, MLB.COM 
http://www.mlb.com/mlb/draftday/rules.jsp (last visited May 20, 2015); see also 
O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 967–68 (discussing how football recruits are 
effectively forced to play for NCAA programs because they cannot enter the NFL 
out of high school).  
7 Basketball and football recruits who are skilled enough to play NCAA 
Division I athletics “do not typically pursue other options for continuing their 
education and athletic careers beyond high school”, such as other college or 
professional leagues, because “[n]one of these other divisions, associations, or 
professional leagues . . . provide the same combinations of goods or services 
offered by FBS football and Division I basketball schools.” O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 
3d at 967; see also Scott Kacsmar, Where Does NFL Talent Come From?, 
BLEACHER REPORT (May 16, 2013), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1641528-
where-does-nfl-talent-come-from (explaining that only two of the 1,947 players 
who played at least one game in the NFL in 2012 did not play in college); Jay 
Schalin, SCHALIN: Time for Universities to Punt Football, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 1, 
2011, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/sep/1/time-for-universities-to-
punt-football/ (discussing the success of MLB subsidizing its own minor league 
system and the academic success of college baseball players versus their football 
counterparts).   
8 For example, each of the 254 players taken in the 2013 NFL Draft and each 
of the 256 players taken in the 2014 NFL Draft played football collegiately. 2013 
NFL Draft Pick List and Results, ESPN, http://espn.go.com/nfl/draft/rounds/_/ 
year/2013 (last visited May 20, 2015); 2014 NFL Draft Pick List and Results, 
ESPN, http://espn.go.com/nfl/draft/rounds/_/year/2014 (last visited May 14, 2015).  
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created a reality in which collegiate athletic teams effectively function as 
“feeder” programs for professional leagues.9 Essentially, regardless of 
whether an athlete is ready to turn pro out of high school, he is forced to 
wait, and if he wants to have a chance to realize the professional dream at 
the end of that waiting period, he must play somewhere in the interim.  His 
best (and effectively only) option is to seek a spot on a collegiate team 
where he will be barred from earning any direct income as a result of 
athletic performance while remaining exposed to the same injury risks that 
would be present if he were playing for a professional team.   
However, this Note does not address the issues relating to student-
athlete compensation as a whole.  Rather, it specifically focuses on whether 
or not these athletes should be provided, or at least entitled to obtain, loss 
of value insurance for their future earnings.  The college athlete, stuck 
between wanting to ensure his health and well-being in hopes of a 
professional career and wanting to do everything possible to bolster his 
chances of making it, is left unable to fully protect his livelihood.  He 
remains protected should disaster strike in college, but only if his career is 
completely ended.10 If he were projected as a first-round draft pick, thereby 
enabling him to earn perhaps tens of millions of dollars,11 and then suffered 
a debilitating injury during his collegiate career which did not render him 
completely unable to play but still deprived him of some skill, ability, and 
athleticism, he would stand only to earn a fraction of what he previously 
could and without a means of financial redress.12   
                                                                                                                                
9 2013 NFL Draft Pick List and Results, supra note 8; 2014 NFL Draft Pick 
List and Results, supra note 8.  
10 See NCAA Insurance Programs, supra note 2. 
11 For example, the first overall pick of the 2013 NFL Draft signed for $22.19 
million, while the last pick of the first round signed for $6.767 million. 2013 NFL 
Draft First-Round Picks’ Signing Status, NFL (July 30, 2013), 
http://www.nfl.com/draft/story/0ap1000000168476/article/2013-nfl-draft-
firstround-picks-signing-status. The 2013–2014 NBA Rookie Contract Scale, 
which is used to determine the range of potential dollar amounts draft picks can 
sign for, capped the value of a three-year contract for the number one overall pick 
at roughly $16.69 million (120% of the maximum value) while limiting the amount 
for a contract of the same length for the last pick of the first round to $2.21 million 
(80% of the minimum value). 2013 First Round Draft Picks Cap Holds, 
SHAMSPORTS, http://data.shamsports.com/content/pages/data/salaries/draftpickcap 
holds.jsp (last visited May 20, 2015).  
12 Several student-athletes, originally projected as first overall or otherwise 
high draft picks, have seen their draft stock (and their earnings) fall substantially 
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This Note addresses where student-athletes are not protected by 
looking at why athletes who lose everything can protect themselves while 
those who lose nearly everything cannot.  First, the Note starts with a 
general discussion of sports loss of value insurance.  Second, the Note then 
provides an overview of the current NCAA Catastrophic Injury Insurance 
Program, as well as an explanation of the specialized Exceptional Student-
Athlete Disability Insurance program available to select college athletes.  
Third, the discussion includes a brief explanation of what the NCAA deems 
to be “impermissible benefits” and examines the specific NCAA Bylaws 
that work in conjunction to effectively bar student-athletes from purchasing 
loss of value insurance.  Fourth, the Note lays the groundwork as to how 
student-athletes could successfully challenge for the right to obtain loss of 
value insurance free from restriction and the legal and policy arguments 
that could be made in their favor.  Fifth, possible remedies and suggestions 
for how the NCAA and its member institutions could effectively implement 
a loss of value program, should they choose or be forced to do so, are 
explained.  Sixth, the Note examines the likely impact that the creation of a 
loss of value insurance program (or a private equivalent) could have for 
NCAA athletes, its member institutions, and the insurance industry.  
Finally, the Note addresses the possible concerns arising from the 
implementation of such a program. 
 
                                                                                                                                
after suffering an injury in college. Former Kentucky center Nerlens Noel, 
projected as the number one pick in the 2013 NBA Draft, suffered a torn ACL 
during his 2012–13 freshman season and ended up being drafted at number six 
overall, a slide that cost him nearly $5,622,100 of guaranteed money in his first 
two seasons alone. Neal J. Leitereg, How Much Money Did Nerlens Noel’s Draft-
Night Slide Cost Him?, EXAMINER.COM (June 29, 2013), 
http://www.examiner.com/article/how-much-money-did-nerlens-noel-s-draft-
night-slide-cost-him. Former South Carolina football player Marcus Lattimore, 
projected by most analysts to be a late first-round pick and the first running back 
taken in the 2013 NFL Draft, tore his left ACL in 2011 and then his right ACL the 
following season and fell to the fourth round, securing a $2.4 million contract, only 
$300,584 of which was guaranteed, rather than the contract in the $7.5 million 
range typically given to late first-round picks. Darryl Slater, Marcus Lattimore Will 
Get to Play with Another Comeback Running Back, Frank Gore, in San Francisco, 
POST & COURIER, Apr. 28, 2013, http://www.postandcourier.com/ 
article/20130428/PC20/130429278/1037/marcus-lattimore-will-get-to-play-with-
another-comeback-running-back-frank-gore-in-san-francisco&source=RSS.  
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II. BACKGROUND 
 
A. ATHLETIC LOSS OF VALUE INSURANCE 
 
 While there are different types of sports loss of value policies,13 
student-athletes typically pursue a specific type of coverage commonly 
referred to as a “loss of draft position” provision.14 For purposes of this 
Note, “loss of value” shall only refer generally to loss of draft position 
coverage, as this form of protection is the only one relevant to collegiate 
athletes.  This coverage is aimed at protecting athletes who are drafted 
lower than they likely would have been had they not suffered some sort of 
injury or illness that affected their athletic ability.15 To obtain loss of value 
coverage, it must be combined with a disability policy.16 Despite the appeal 
of such protection, the prevalence of these policies has decreased in recent 
years, due in large part to the current economic situation in the United 
States.17 
 In order for the student-athlete to collect on the loss of value 
policy, the suffered injury “must be serious and lasting.”18 In order for an 
injury to be considered serious, it must “negatively affect the player’s skills 
in a manner that causes substantial and material deterioration in his or her 
                                                                                                                                
13 Glenn M. Wong & Chris Deubert, The Legal & Business Aspects of Career-
Ending Disability Insurance Policies in Professional and College Sports, 17 VILL. 
SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 473, 495–96 (2010). There are two other common types of 
sports loss of value policies available only to professional athletes, mostly due to 
the fact that they turn on contractual earnings and free agency, two concepts which 
are unique to professional sports leagues. The first type of professional loss of 
value coverage protects a player who is nearing free agency by setting a “threshold 
amount of value lost based on the player’s most recent contract offer.” Id. The 
policy requires that the player miss a certain amount of games and that the next 
contract offer subsequent to the injury or illness is less than the threshold amount. 
Id. The second type of coverage involves agreeing to a maximum benefit amount, 
whereby if the player ends up receiving less than that amount because of injury or 
illness, the insurer pays the difference. Id. The premiums for these policies can be 
substantial, and are often in the $100,000 range. Id. 
14 Id. at 496–97. 
15 Id. at 496. 
16 Darren Rovell, Matt Barkley Had No Insurance, ESPN (Apr. 30, 2013), 
http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/9228764/matt-barkley-returned-usc-trojans-
insurance-sources. 
17 Wong & Deubert, supra note 13, at 496.  
18 Id. at 496–97. 
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ability to perform.”19 If the student-athlete aims to collect as a result of a 
sickness, the illness “must negatively affect his or her skills 
permanently.”20 In other words, the injury suffered must be the cause for 
the player’s drop in the draft. 
The loss of value provision usually kicks in when the insured 
enters the draft and loses a predetermined amount of value (often 40%) 
from his predetermined draft value.21 The insurer initially determines 
compensation based on the student-athlete’s anticipated draft position, 
generally capping the maximum liability limit at 50% of the expected 
compensation22 or a flat number, typically $5 million, regardless of the 
amount of actual financial harm suffered.  If the insured is shown to have 
lost $5 million or more as a result of his fall in the draft, he is able to 
collect the full amount.23 These contracts typically contain a clause that 
protects the insurer should the insured athlete end up earning more than the 
anticipated compensation amount during a specified number of years over 
the course of his professional career.24 If it turns out that the student-
athlete, through income and the loss of draft position policy, ends up 
earning more than the amount he was originally covered for, he is required 
to return the difference to the insurer.25 It appears that other specific terms 
of the policy, such as whether the coverage period includes one or two 
collegiate seasons, are negotiated with each athlete individually. 
 The process to obtain loss of value coverage for a college athlete 
projected as a top pick is as follows:  the athlete, widely projected to be a 
                                                                                                                                
19 Id. at 497. 
20 Id. There is no threshold requirement that a player must miss a certain 
amount of games as a professional in order to be indemnified. Id. at 496. 
21 Rovell, supra note 16.  
22 Wong & Deubert, supra note 13, at 497. For example, if the player was 
expected to be drafted in the top three picks of the upcoming draft and the expected 
guaranteed income from such a draft spot was $20 million, the limit on the policy 
would be $10 million. Should the player only receive a $5 million contract due to 
the injury or illness, the policy would pay the full $10 million, leaving the player 
with a total of $15 million. 
23 Rovell, supra note 16. 
24 Wong & Deubert, supra note 13, at 497. 
25 Id. Continuing from the example in note 22, supra, if the specified term was 
five years, and the player ended up earning $12 million in income, this amount, 
combined with the $10 million insurance payout, would leave the player with $22 
million in total earnings, or $2 million more than the original expected amount.  
Therefore, the player would be required to refund $2 million to the insurer. 
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high pick in the draft of his sport’s professional league, approaches an 
independent insurer seeking coverage.  The insurer then assesses the 
athlete’s draft stock and assigns him a projected spot.26 Based on the 
typical guaranteed earnings from the projected draft spot, the insurer then 
creates a policy that includes both total disability coverage, as required, and 
a loss of value provision.27 The amount of coverage is limited to a 
percentage or a maximum (typically $5 million) and subject to the 
requirement that the insured loses a percentage of value in the draft.28 
 For example, a star quarterback who is a consensus top draft pick 
in the upcoming National Football League Draft would likely be able to 
secure a total disability policy with a loss of value provision for the 
significant premium of $52,000.29 The payout would be either a percentage 
of lost earnings or a capped total (e.g., $5 million) depending on the wishes 
of the insured and the insurer.30 In this hypothetical, based on the 
projections of his draft position, the quarterback is evaluated to be likely 
taken fourth overall, which typically nets an estimated $20 million in 
guaranteed earnings.31 If the quarterback then suffered an injury during that 
collegiate football season and subsequently fell in the draft, he could 
collect on the difference between his projected $20 million and whatever 
his actual guaranteed earnings are, up to the percentage limit32 or the $5 
million maximum included in the policy.33 
 One notable example of an athlete who purchased loss of draft 
position insurance is former University of Southern California quarterback 
Matt Leinart.  Leinart passed on the 2005 National Football League Draft 
after his junior year and returned to school, at which point he purchased a 
                                                                                                                                
26 Rovell, supra note 16. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Chris Larcheveque, Senior Vice President of Sports and Entertainment at 
Hanleigh Insurance, estimated this premium, as well as the other amounts 
contained in this example, based on former University of Southern California 
quarterback Matt Barkley. The estimates are hypothetical, as Barkley did not 
obtain insurance of any kind for his senior season. Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Wong & Deubert, supra note 13, at 497. 
33 Rovell, supra note 16. 
2015 EVEN I CAN’T COVER ME 529 
 
loss of value policy for himself, presumably with private funds.34 The 
coverage only kicked in if Leinart, who was slated to go in the top five 
picks had he come out as a junior, fell past the fifteenth pick in the 2006 
draft.35 Leinart fell, but not far enough to trigger the policy, and was taken 
tenth overall.36 
B. CURRENT AVAILABILITY OF ATHLETIC LOSS OF VALUE 
INSURANCE 
 
Athletic loss of value protection, particularly with loss of draft 
value coverage, is not widely available.37 Very few insurance companies 
offer policies to cover an athlete’s draft status, and those that do often do so 
for substantial premiums.38 There is not much available information about 
the amount of underwriters offering these types of policies or who these 
underwriters are.39 
The limited availability is due to the high risk to the insurers and 
the lack of profitability.40 This results in a limited market because coverage 
is only aimed at a very select subset of athletes for whom the protection 
would be viable given the high premiums.41 The NCAA prohibition 
presumably has a substantial impact on this, as its requirement that outside 
financing not be used to secure the coverage42 substantially reduces the 
                                                                                                                                
34 Darren Rovell, Source: Marquise Lee insured for $10M, ESPN (Aug. 30, 
2013), http://espn.go.com/los-angeles/college-football/story/_/id/ 9614189/usc-
trojans-marqise-lee-picks-10m-insurance-policy-source-says. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Shaun H. Crosner, Elite Student-Athletes Should Take Stock of Their 
Disability Insurance Needs as They Head into the Summer, POLICYHOLDER 
INFORMER (June 27, 2013), http://www.policyholderinformer.com/2013/06/27/ 
elite-student-athletes-should-take-stock-of-their-disability-insurance-needs-as-
they-head-into-the-summer/. 
38 Id.; Warren K. Zola, Does Lack of Real Insurance Drive Players to NFL?, 
SPORTS LAW BLOG (Jan. 20, 2011), http://sports-law.blogspot.com/2011/01/does-
lack-of-real-insurance-drive.html. 
39 One known underwriter for these policies is Hanleigh Insurance. Rovell, 
supra note 16.   
40 Crosner, supra note 37. 
41 Zola, supra note 38. 
42 Id. 
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pool of eligible purchasers.43 The result is a vicious cycle where the limited 
customer base and high risk of the coverage creates high premiums, and 
these high premiums serve to limit the potential purchasers of such 
insurance. 
C. THE BASIC NCAA STUDENT-ATHLETE DISABILITY 
INSURANCE POLICY 
 
The NCAA requires each of its member institutions and their 
respective athletes to maintain medical insurance as a prerequisite for 
athletic participation and offers its own coverage known as the Group Basic 
Accident Medical Program (hereinafter “G.B.A.M.P.”).44 Students can 
always be covered through their own family insurance plans, but in the 
event they are not, institutions must cover their athletes up to the $90,000 
deductible on the Catastrophic Injury Insurance program,45 which can be 
$75,000 or $90,000, depending on the source of the basic accident 
coverage.46 The NCAA offers coverage to satisfy the requirement through 
its G.B.A.M.P., which the schools then offer to their athletes.47 Additional 
coverage is also provided during NCAA championships, insuring student-
athletes for up to $90,000 in medical expenses, which effectively doubles 
the coverage provided by either the school or the student’s family 
insurance.48 After this level, the Catastrophic Injury Insurance coverage 
kicks in.49 
                                                                                                                                
43 The majority of insurers generally do not offer policies for which there is 
not a large market, as it would likely be cost-prohibitive. The NCAA’s restriction 
effectively reduces the possible eligible pool for loss of value coverage (college 
athletes) to zero. 
44 See Student-Athlete Insurance Certification Legislation: Overview, NCAA, 
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/insurance/student-athlete-insurance-
certification-legislation (last visited May 20, 2015). 
45 NCAA Insurance Programs, supra note 2; NCAA Catastrophic Injury 
Insurance Program Frequently Asked Questions, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/ 
sites/default/files/Cat%2BFAQs%2B8.12.pdf (last visited Jan. 14, 2015) 
[hereinafter “Catastrophic Injury Insurance FAQ”]. 
46 Id. 
47 NCAA Insurance Programs, supra note 2. 
48 Insurance Coverage for Student-Athletes, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/ 
about/resources/insurance/insurance-coverage-student-athletes (last visited May 
20, 2015). 
49 Id. 
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The NCAA provides a form of disability insurance to all its 
athletes, referred to as the Catastrophic Injury Insurance program.50 The 
current program, underwritten by Mutual of Omaha Insurance Company,51 
“covers the student-athlete who is catastrophically injured while 
participating in a covered intercollegiate athletic activity.”52 It contains two 
different deductible limits: the first is $75,000 and pertains to schools that 
participate in the G.B.A.M.P.; the second is $90,000 and concerns all other 
eligible institutions.53 The policy automatically covers every active member 
institution, and the NCAA pays all premiums,54 which typically amount to 
a total of $10 million annually.55 
 
D. THE NCAA’S EXCEPTIONAL STUDENT-ATHLETE DISABILITY 
INSURANCE PROGRAM 
 
1. Exceptional Student-Athlete Disability Insurance: An 
Overview 
 
 In addition to its Catastrophic Injury Insurance program, the 
NCAA offers extra insurance coverage to a select subset of college 
athletes.  The permanent total disability policy, known as the “Exceptional 
Student-Athlete Disability Insurance” program (hereinafter “E.S.D.I.”), 
was instituted in 1990 but originally only covered football and men’s 
basketball.56 The program was then expanded, first in 1991 to include 
baseball,57 again in 1993 to include men’s ice hockey,58 and then a third 
time in 1998 to include women’s basketball.59 The NCAA created the 
program in an effort to help protect its student-athletes from both injury 
concerns and attempts by agents to lure the student-athletes away from 
                                                                                                                                
50 NCAA Insurance Programs, supra note 2. 
51 Catastrophic Injury Insurance FAQ, supra note 45. 
52 NCAA Insurance Programs, supra note 2. 
53 Catastrophic Injury Insurance FAQ, supra note 45. 
54 Id. 
55 Wong & Deubert, supra note 13, at 508 (discussing the NCAA’s 
contribution to its E.S.D.I. policy). 
56 NCAA Insurance Programs, supra note 2. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
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school and into the professional leagues.60 
 In order to be eligible for coverage, the athlete first must have 
“remaining eligibility” at an NCAA institution in “intercollegiate football, 
men’s or women’s basketball, baseball, or men’s ice hockey . . . ”61 The 
athlete then must demonstrate that he or she has “professional potential to 
be selected in the first three rounds of the upcoming National Football 
League or National Hockey League draft or the first round of the upcoming 
draft of the National Basketball Association, Major League Baseball, or 
Women’s National Basketball Association. . . .”62 The policy does not 
explicitly list what criteria is used to determine whether a student-athlete 
demonstrates “professional potential,”63 but the NCAA often uses 
professional scouting services to assist in their evaluations, which can be an 
inexact science.64 A look at the list of athletes who have obtained E.S.D.I. 
coverage in the past appears to show that it requires the display of 
exceptional talent, high opinions from scouts and a significant level of pre-
draft hype.65 
 Athletes can play their way into E.S.D.I. eligibility.  If an athlete is 
evaluated before the start of a collegiate season and found to be ineligible 
under the E.S.D.I. program, but his play during that season subsequently 
elevates his status and scouts’ projections to the level necessary for 
eligibility, he can apply for and obtain coverage in-season.66 The policies 
are written in a way that incentivizes players to want to continue playing 
their sport, as they will be able to earn more as a professional than they 
                                                                                                                                
60 Wong & Deubert, supra note 13, at 506 (discussing the NCAA’s 
motivations for instituting the program, which also include a possible desire to 
increase public opinion by demonstrating a desire to “more closely look[] out for 
the best interests of the young men and women participating as opposed to their 
own financial coffers . . . .”). 
61 NCAA Insurance Programs, supra note 2. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Gary Klein, Premium Players, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2005, http://articles. 
latimes.com/2005/feb/20/sports/sp-leinart20. 
65 See Wong & Deubert, supra note 13, at 507 n.202, for a list of several 
notable college athletes across each of the covered sports who purchased E.S.D.I. 
coverage. The vast majority of athletes listed were high profile, extremely 
successful as a collegian, and evaluated strongly by scouts.  
66 Klein, supra note 64. 
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would by collecting on a policy.67 
 The policy carries a twenty-four month maximum term and pays 
out a lump sum after a twelve month “elimination period,”68 which 
commences on the date the injury resulting in total disability occurred.69 
The maximum amount of the payout varies by sport.  The amount of 
coverage each student receives is determined by the program 
administrator,70 who bases his decision on the athlete’s prospective status 
in the upcoming draft.71  The rate is calculated per thousand dollars of 
coverage and is “based on the market at the time individual applications are 
reviewed by the program administrator.”72 
The policy typically only pays out for a permanent total disability, 
which requires that the student-athlete’s “disability results from an injury 
or sickness,”73 that the “injury or sickness occurs while the policy is in 
force,”74 and that the athlete “is under the regular care of a qualified 
physician . . . [and] is unable to engage in sporting activity at the 
professional level.”75 In addition, the “applicable elimination period” must 
have elapsed76 and the total disability must “prevent him or her from 
signing any employment contract with any professional team as a 
professional athlete in his or her sporting activity.”77 A permanent total 
disability typically requires that the student-athlete be completely incapable 
of performing his sport for a twelve-month period following the initial 
injury.78 
                                                                                                                                
67 Mike Herndon, NCAA Insurance Program Protects Elite Athletes, Future 
Earnings Against Injury, AL.COM (Aug. 1, 2010), http://www.al.com/ 
sports/index.ssf/2010/08/are_you_in_good_hands.html. 
68 NCAA Insurance Programs, supra note 2. 
69 Id. (explaining that the purpose of the delay is to provide time for the insurer 
to evaluate the nature of the injury or sickness and that no benefits are paid to the 
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73 NCAA Insurance Programs, supra note 2. 
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Student-Athletes for NBA & NCAA Rule Changes, 3 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 
159, 185 (2012). 
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The only other means of payout under the policy is a presumptive 
disability benefit.  In order to collect, the student-athlete’s disability must 
be “medically determined to be the result of (a) an entire and irrecoverable 
loss of sight of both eyes or hearing in both ears, or (b) total and 
irrecoverable loss of use of one hand or one foot, or (c) quadriplegia, or (d) 
paraplegia,”79 all of which would serve to prevent the athlete from “ever 
participating in his or her sporting activity at the professional level.”80 The 
presumptive disability benefit includes essentially an acceleration clause 
that allows the injured insured to avoid having to wait for the twelve-month 
elimination period to pass.  After ninety consecutive days from the date of 
injury, at the insured student-athlete’s choosing, together with the approval 
of the insurer, the “outstanding benefits may be commuted to present value 
lump sum at a rate agreed upon” by the two parties.81 
 One of the most appealing parts of the program is its relative 
affordability.  Because E.S.D.I. is a group program, the insurer can share 
administrative costs and spread risk among the participating NCAA 
member institutions.82 The result is that these premiums are almost always 
cheaper than alternative policies through private insurers.83 While the 
premiums for the policy can be as much as ten thousand to twelve thousand 
per one million insured,84 it contains a provision that assists student-
athletes with obtaining financing, if necessary, to pay these premiums.85 
The interest rate for the pre-approved loan is “very competitive”86 and is 
often better than what the student-athlete could obtain on the open 
market,87 typically at 1.5% above prime.88 To expedite the process, the 
                                                                                                                                
79 NCAA Insurance Programs, supra note 2. 
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82 Wong & Deubert, supra note 13, at 510. 
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84 Id. at 507 (explaining typical premiums for the E.S.D.I. policy). A typical 
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lender pays the borrowed funds directly to the insurer.89 The purchaser is 
not responsible for making any payments on the loan until one of three 
things occurs: “(1) the student-athlete signs a professional contract, (2) the 
disability benefits become available due to a covered injury or sickness or 
(3) the coverage is no longer in effect and the loan note matures.”90 
 
2. Participation in E.S.D.I. 
 
 According to the NCAA, between 100 and 120 athletes participate 
in E.S.D.I. per season, a figure that tends to remain constant.91 A 2005 
article reported that “approximately seventy-five to eighty percent of those 
[enrolled] are college football players.”92 Within those figures, it is 
estimated that 75% of first-round NFL and NBA draft picks are enrolled in 
E.S.D.I.93 Potential MLB and NHL first-round picks have a much lower 
enrollment rate, typically falling in the 10% range.94 Women’s basketball 
players hardly participate in the program, usually enrolling only one or two 
student-athletes per year.95 
Notable examples of recent high-profile collegiate athletes to 
purchase policies include former University of Stanford quarterback 
Andrew Luck, former University of Southern California players Reggie 
Bush, quarterback Matt Leinart and quarterback Carson Palmer, and former 
University of Florida quarterback Tim Tebow.96 University of Texas A&M 
quarterback Johnny Manziel, the 2012 Heisman Trophy winner, and 
University of South Carolina defensive end Jadeveon Clowney, projected 
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88 Herndon, supra note 67. 
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to be a top-five pick in the 2014 National Football League Draft, both 
sought insurance policies prior to the start of their 2013 collegiate football 
seasons, though it is not clear whether they took part in the E.S.D.I. 
program or sought private insurance.97 
Not all high-profile college athletes have taken part in the program.  
The premiums are extremely high even with the NCAA’s group rate, and 
because the program only pays out in the event of a career-ending injury, 
many players forego coverage.98 Former University of Southern California 
quarterback Matt Barkley did not follow in his predecessors’ footsteps, 
opting to forego any insurance coverage, including E.S.D.I., when 
returning for his senior season.99 
 The NCAA’s program is not the only option for student-athletes.  
The private market for this insurance is limited, but the need for it 
developed in the mid-1990s when professional athlete salaries began to rise 
substantially.100 Private underwriters provide coverage for athletes who 
either do not qualify for E.S.D.I. or who want more coverage than the 
NCAA offers.101 Student-athletes can secure their own policies, as well as 
accompanying loans, with other insurers and for amounts that exceed that 
NCAA’s $5 million in coverage, provided that no third party is involved in 
the process of securing the loans.102 Former University of Kentucky center 
Nerlens Noel obtained private disability insurance similar to the NCAA’s, 
reportedly paying between $40,000 and $60,000 to privately secure a $10 
million policy from Lloyd’s of London for coverage during his freshman 
basketball season.103 
                                                                                                                                
97 Id. 
98 Herndon, supra note 67 (quoting former University of Auburn player Lee 
Ziemba in citing the policy’s failure to cover loss of value injuries as a reason for 
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3. Rarity of Collecting on the Policy  
 
 Despite the availability of and consistent participation in the 
NCAA program, there are very few instances of successful collection by 
student-athletes over the past fifteen years.104 The NCAA has 
acknowledged that fewer than half a dozen claims have been made under 
this policy,105 but it has generally been reluctant to provide information 
regarding the actual number of claims and payouts made, citing 
confidentially concerns with the insurance providers.106 
There is only one widely-publicized instance of an athlete 
benefitting from permanent total disability coverage, either through 
E.S.D.I. or private insurance.107 Former University of Florida defensive 
tackle Ed Chester opted to forego the 1998 NFL draft and return to school 
for his senior year.108 Projected as a potential first-round pick had he come 
out as a junior, he was slated to be drafted in the first round.109 During his 
senior year, Chester blew out his knee and never played again, and 
subsequently successfully collected $1 million from a private policy he 
purchased for $8,000.110 
 The lack of claims made on the policy is not surprising given the 
state of modern sports medicine and technological innovations.111 With 
today’s medical advances, college athletes are less likely than they have 
ever been to suffer a career-ending injury, which in turn makes it more 
unlikely that they will be able to collect on an E.S.D.I. policy.  Juanita 
Sheely, the NCAA’s Director of Travel and Insurance, acknowledged the 
rarity of collecting on the policy, citing that, “‘[a]s medical technology has 
advanced, there’s [sic] a lot of good rehab facilities and procedures 
[available] that, except for the most dire of injuries, most of the time 
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105 Marc Isenberg, The “Student-Athlete Disability Insurance Program” Isn’t 
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[athletes] can come back from it.’”112 However, despite the low rate of 
payouts and potentially hefty price tag, student-athletes continue to 
purchase these policies.113 
 
4. Legal Challenges to E.S.D.I. Policies 
 
 There has been surprisingly little litigation stemming from the 
E.S.D.I. program.  One notable challenge came from former University of 
Georgia football player Decory Bryant.114 On October 21, 2003, Bryant, 
then a student-athlete at Georgia, informed an assistant athletic director 
(hereinafter “AAD”) that he wanted E.S.D.I. coverage.115 The AAD told 
Bryant that he would prepare the paperwork for him and then proceeded to 
contact Lloyd’s of London, the E.S.D.I. provider.116 On October 24, 2003, 
the AAD confirmed in a letter sent to Lloyd’s that the school sought to 
purchase E.S.D.I. coverage for Bryant.117 The AAD did not include a 
coverage request form signed by Bryant as required by Lloyd’s.118 The next 
day, October 25, 2013, Bryant suffered a career-ending spinal injury while 
playing for his football team, which left him disabled.119 The University of 
Georgia athletic department then had Bryant sign the coverage request 
form October 29, 2013.120 The AAD submitted the form that same day, but 
Lloyd’s subsequently informed the school that it would not backdate its 
coverage.121 Bryant then sued the school for its failure to effectuate his 
E.S.D.I. coverage.122 After more than five years of litigation, the two sides 
settled for $400,000 in 2010.123 
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E. NCAA’S RESTRICTIONS ON THE PURCHASE OF LOSS OF VALUE 
INSURANCE 
 
There is no specific NCAA bylaw that expressly prohibits 
obtaining loss of value insurance.124 Prior to 2010, the NCAA did not allow 
its student-athletes to obtain any form of “loss of value” insurance.125 
Following significant debate, it changed its stance that year, eventually 
permitting players to obtain such coverage without violating NCAA 
rules.126 There are only two ways athletes can obtain loss of value insurance 
without committing a violation – either the student (or his immediate 
family) must purchase it without any outside financing127 or the school can 
pay for it through its Student Assistance Fund, as Florida State University 
did prior to the 2014 season for Heisman Trophy winner Jameis Winston 
and Texas A&M University did in an attempt to keep its star offensive 
tackle Cedric Ogbuehi in school for one more year.128 Since the NCAA 
does not offer this type of plan itself or through a partner insurer, as it does 
with the E.S.D.I. program, student-athletes and their families are forced to 
go to outside insurers.  The premiums for these types of policies are 
significant, potentially reaching into the six-figure range.129 The effective 
result is that virtually every athlete is priced out from protecting himself in 
                                                                                                                                
124 See 2014–15 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, available at http://www.ncaa 
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this way.130  
The NCAA classifies obtaining this insurance as an impermissible 
or “extra” benefit, as defined below, and therefore prohibits it.  The 
rationale is that the athlete, by virtue of having this protection, is trading on 
his future earnings and his status as a collegiate athlete.131 By the NCAA’s 
definition, this behavior constitutes an “extra benefit” expressly forbidden 
by NCAA rules,132 and compromises his amateur status as a collegiate 
athlete. 
 
F. “EXTRA BENEFITS” ACCORDING TO THE NCAA 
 
 According to NCAA Bylaw 16.11.2.1, student-athletes shall not 
accept any extra benefits.133 It goes on to define an “extra benefit” as “any 
special arrangement by an institutional employee or representative of the 
institution’s athletics interest to provide a student-athlete or the student-
athlete family member or friend a benefit not expressly authorized by 
NCAA legislation.”134 Bylaw 16.02.3, which contains the same definition 
of “extra benefit” as Bylaw 16.11.2.1, further stipulates that the athlete is 
not in violation of this rule if he can demonstrate that “the same benefit is 
generally available to the institution’s students or their family members or 
friends or to a particular segment of the student-body . . . determined on a 
basis unrelated to athletics ability.”135 The rules essentially prohibit any 
form of pay for athletes.136 
Particularly relevant to the loss of value insurance context is 
NCAA Bylaw 12.1.2.1.6, which prohibits “[p]referential treatment, benefits 
or services because of the individual’s athletics reputation or skill or pay-
back potential as a professional athlete, unless such treatment, benefits or 
services are specifically permitted” by the NCAA.137 Read plainly, the rule 
generally prohibits an athlete from “trading on” their future earning 
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potential as a professional athlete, subject to a few exceptions.  Securing 
loans to pay for loss of value insurance is not one of these exceptions.138 
Therefore obtaining loans to pay for loss of value insurance is a form of 
“trading on” an athlete’s “pay-back potential”139 and is within the scope of 
the rule, making it a prohibited activity.  In sum, NCAA Bylaws 16.11.2.1, 
16.02.3 and 12.1.2.1.6 work in conjunction to prevent the purchase of loss 
of value coverage. 
 
G. COURTS’ WILLINGNESS TO REVIEW NCAA BYLAWS AND 
RULES 
 
 Students have standing to sue the NCAA when they have suffered 
“actual injury to a legally protected interest.”140 While the individual 
athletes may not be a party to the contract between the NCAA and its 
member institutions, they are entitled to bring an action based on the 
agreement if the parties “intended to benefit the nonparty, provided that the 
benefit claimed is a direct and not merely incidental benefit of the 
contract.”141 The intent to benefit the third party need not be explicit in the 
agreement, but rather must be apparent in the terms of the agreement, its 
surrounding circumstances, or both.142 The Colorado Court of Appeals 
reasoned that the importance of the NCAA’s function to benefit its student-
athletes, coupled with its role in determining their eligibility, enabled the 
assumption that student-athletes were likely to succeed in establishing 
third-party beneficiary standing regarding the contract between the NCAA 
and its member institutions.143 The Colorado Court of Appeals held that the 
“NCAA’s constitution, bylaws, and regulations evidence a clear intent to 
benefit student-athletes.”144 
 Courts typically adopt the administrative law standard of “arbitrary 
and capricious” when examining NCAA rules and regulations.145 Although 
the basis for its determination is not clear, the Kentucky Supreme Court 
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stated in National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Lasege that “relief 
from [the] judicial system should be available if voluntary athletic 
associations act arbitrarily and capriciously toward student-athletes.”146 The 
court in Lasege hinted at the possibility of judicial review being justified 
“because the NCAA occupied the role of a quasi-state actor with respect to 
individual student-athletes.”147 However, the United States Supreme Court 
held that the NCAA is not itself a state actor and its member institutions’ 
adherence to state rules does not constitute the state action required to 
invoke a civil rights claim.148 
 Traditionally, courts have been reluctant to intervene in the internal 
affairs of voluntary associations, such as the NCAA, except on the most 
limited grounds.149 When they do, it appears that an allegation of the 
violation or invasion of a civil or property right must be made in order to 
maintain standing.150 The court in Bloom v. National Collegiate Athletic 
Association concluded that Bloom had third-party beneficiary standing to 
sue the NCAA,151 despite his status as a nonmember and his failure to 
assert a property right,152 because his claim of arbitrary and capricious 
action on the part of the NCAA asserted a “violation of the duty of good 
faith and fair dealing” implied in the contract between the NCAA and its 
member institutions.153 
 
III. LEGAL GROUNDS FOR CHALLENGING THE PROHIBITION 
– THE “ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS” STANDARD 
 
Based on the NCAA’s current bylaws, its current insurance 
policies and justifications, and economic stakes for its student-athletes, the 
NCAA should provide its student-athletes with loss of value insurance, or, 
in the alternative, allow them the opportunity to obtain it. 
One path a potential challenger to the NCAA’s current policy 
could take would be through a direct challenge of the rule.  The student-
athlete would need to go outside NCAA rules and secure a private loan to 
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purchase loss of value insurance.  The NCAA would then presumably 
declare the student ineligible for having received an extra benefit.  With his 
ability to participate in his sport denied, the student would then bring suit to 
challenge the NCAA bylaw on the grounds that it is arbitrary and 
capricious, similar to the path taken in Bloom.154 In the alternative, a 
student could seek to protect his eligibility by obtaining a preliminary 
injunction against the NCAA’s enforcement of its rules either before or 
after he purchases the insurance.  Each of these tracks is discussed below. 
 
A. THE “ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS” STANDARD 
 
When reviewing the NCAA’s decisions or rules, courts will apply 
the “arbitrary and capricious” standard that is prevalent in administrative 
law.155 In doing so, the court employs a narrow standard of review and is 
not to substitute its own judgment for that of the organization whose 
decisions it is reviewing.156 The organization, in defending its decision, 
“must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation 
for its action[s].”157 This examination must produce a “rational connection 
between the facts found and the choice made.”158 When reviewing the 
organization’s decision, the court must determine whether the organization 
took into account the relevant factors and whether a clear error in judgment 
has occurred.159 Examples of “arbitrary and capricious” decision-making 
include where the organization has failed entirely to consider a key element 
of the problem, offered an explanation of its decision that does not follow 
from the evidence before it or espouses a justification that is so implausible 
that it cannot possibly be “ascribed to a difference in view or the product of 
[organizational] expertise.”160 
Courts are typically very deferential to the NCAA in their review 
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of its rules and regulations.161 In order for a rule or regulation to not be 
arbitrary or capricious, it must be “reasonably related to [its] intended 
purpose.”162 If the NCAA arbitrarily and capriciously applies rules that are 
otherwise reasonable, judicial intrusion into the affairs of the private, 
voluntary organization is warranted.163 The adoption of such a standard is 
indicative of “judicial reluctance to micromanage the manner in which 
private associations or dedication institutions apply their policies.”164 The 
Kentucky Supreme Court noted in National Collegiate Athletic Association 
v. Lasege that “relief from [the] judicial system should be available if 
voluntary athletic associations act arbitrarily and capriciously toward 
student-athletes.”165 A private organization, such as the NCAA, is acting 
arbitrarily and capriciously only “where it is ‘clearly erroneous,’ and by 
‘clearly erroneous’ [courts] mean ‘unsupported by substantial 
evidence.’”166 The Supreme Court of Indiana, in analyzing a claim against a 
private athletic organization, defined an act as arbitrary and capricious 
where “it is willful and unreasonable, without consideration and in 
disregard of the facts or circumstances in the case, or without some basis 
which would lead a reasonable and honest person to the same 
conclusion.”167 
 
B. STANDING 
 
Before any challenge could be brought against the NCAA and its 
bylaws, which exist by virtue of a contract between the NCAA and its 
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member institutions,168 the student-athlete must establish third-party 
standing.  The question of whether a third party to a contract has standing 
to bring an action upon it is a matter of state law.169 The Colorado Supreme 
Court in Bloom v. National Collegiate Athletic Association noted that a 
“party has standing to seek relief when he or she has suffered actual injury 
to a legally protected interest.”170 Although an individual is not an express 
party to a contract, he may institute an action on the contract “if the parties 
to the agreement intended to benefit the nonparty”171 so long as “the benefit 
claimed is a direct, and not merely incidental, benefit of the contract.”172 
The intent to benefit the third party does not need to be explicitly laid out in 
the contract, but it must be apparent from its terms, surrounding 
circumstances, or both.173 The NCAA’s constitution, bylaws, and 
regulations were held to “evidence a clear intent to benefit student-
athletes.”174 As a third-party beneficiary, the challenger would have rights 
that are no greater than those possessed by the original parties to the 
contract, which would be the NCAA and its member institutions in this 
context.175 
 
C. APPLYING THE STANDARD 
 
1. Same Issue, Different Application 
 
The first step in challenging the NCAA’s prohibition on loss of 
value insurance would be to attack it on the ground of disparate application 
of similar rules.  As discussed earlier, the NCAA permits athletes to obtain 
outside financing to purchase total disability policies, but it places extreme 
                                                                                                                                
168 See Potuto, supra note 161, at 267 (discussing the structure of the 
relationship between the NCAA and its member institutions as a “multi-subject 
contract entered into by more than a thousand members”). 
169 Miree v. DeKalb Cnty., 433 U.S. 25, 29–34 (1977). 
170 Bloom v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n,, 93 P.3d 621, 623 (Colo. App. 
2004). 
171 Id.; see, e.g., Bochese v. Ponce Inlet, 405 F.3d 964, 981 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(applying Florida law); Sovereign Bank v. BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., 533 F.3d 
162, 172 (3d Cir. 2008) (applying Pennsylvania law). 
172 Bloom, 93 P.3d at 623.  
173 Id. 
174 Id. 
175 United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO-CLC v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 361, 363 
(1990). 
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restrictions on financing loss of value insurance.  The same right is at stake 
in both cases – protecting future earnings against harm.  However, the 
NCAA arbitrarily prevents one while allowing another with no clear reason 
for the distinction. 
The strongest argument to demonstrate the arbitrary nature of the 
prohibition is to attack the NCAA’s rationale.  It justifies the rule on the 
grounds that athletes should not be able to trade off their future earnings as 
athletes if they wish to maintain amateur status.176 The “trade off” is in the 
form of the loan secured in order to pay for the loss of value policy.  The 
belief, presumably, is that the lender is only willing to pay out such a 
substantial sum to a person with no current income because it is confident 
in the student’s ability to earn enough money as a professional athlete to 
repay the loan.  Therefore, in the eyes of the NCAA, this act constitutes 
trading on an individual’s status as a collegiate athlete.177 
Where the NCAA’s argument is vulnerable is that it already allows 
NCAA athletes to trade off their status in exactly this way but in a slightly 
different context.  As discussed above, the NCAA has an exception, 
contained in its Exceptional Student-Athlete Disability Insurance Program, 
which allows student-athletes and their families to secure a third-party loan 
to pay premiums for a special insurance program.178 In doing so, they are 
obtaining this loan purely by way of their status as a collegiate athlete.  
This situation is directly analogous to obtaining loss of value insurance.  In 
both cases, student-athletes are seeking to protect their future interests 
regarding their earning capacity as athletes.  In order to obtain this 
protection, they have to secure a loan that is likely only available to them 
because of their future earning potential as professional athletes.  However, 
the NCAA allows one (permanent disability insurance) while denying the 
other (loss of value coverage).  There is no readily apparent reason for this 
distinction, particularly in light of the NCAA’s justification for why it 
instituted its E.S.D.I. program in the first place – to protect its student-
athletes against injury and the pressures of agents to make the jump to the 
pros too early.179 
The thrust of the NCAA’s argument for its right to regulate its 
student-athletes in this way is the emphasis it places on amateurism, 
                                                                                                                                
176 Zola, supra note 38. 
177 It makes no difference, under NCAA rules, whether the student-athlete 
himself or a member of family is the one who secures the loan. Id. 
178 NCAA Insurance Programs, supra note 2. 
179 Wong & Deubert, supra note 13, at 506. 
2015 EVEN I CAN’T COVER ME 547 
 
thereby enabling it to prohibit what it views as economic gain by its 
student-athletes by virtue of their athletic ability.180 The NCAA considers 
amateurism to be its most important “core principle” and the reason that 
fans are drawn to college sports. 181 By using “amateur” athletes, the NCAA 
distinguishes its brand from those of professional sports leagues.182 
However, this stubborn adherence to amateurism is simply an excuse for 
the NCAA to profit from its athletes’ athletic talent without having to 
compensate them financially, and instead the athletes should be able to 
enjoy the economic benefits of their skills and abilities.  The NCAA’s 
shifting and inconsistent definition of what it means to be an “amateur” 
further undermines its argument.  The NCAA has changed its own 
definition of what it means to be an amateur numerous times since it 
released its first definition in 1906.183 The NCAA Bylaws allow for 
different treatment of athletes depending on sport.  For example, a tennis 
recruit can receive up to $10,000 in prize money before he enters college 
and still be considered an “amateur” under NCAA rules, while a track and 
field recruit who receives the same would be determined to be ineligible.184 
A football player receiving a Pell grant that raises his total financial aid 
above the cost of attendance does not compromise his amateurism, but if he 
were to decline the grant and accept an equal amount sum as part of an 
endorsement deal, he would be ineligible.185 Finally, it is becoming 
increasingly clear that amateurism has not contributed significantly to 
college sports’ popularity.186 School loyalty and identity with a region of 
                                                                                                                                
180 “Student-athletes shall be amateurs in an intercollegiate sport, and their 
participation should be motivated primarily by education and by the physical, 
mental and social benefits to be derived. Student participation in intercollegiate 
athletics is an avocation, and student-athletes should be protected from exploitation 
by professional and commercial enterprises.”  NCAA Bylaws, supra note 124, at 
art. 2.9. 
181 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 
U.S. 85, 101–02 (1984); O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 
3d 955, 999-1000 (N.D. Cal. 2014), appeals filed, No. 14-16601 (9th Cir. Aug. 21, 
2014), No. 14-17068 (Oct. 21, 2014).  
182 O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 999–1000. 
183 Id. at 973–74, 1000. 
184 Id. at 1000. 
185 Id. 
186 Id. at 977.  O’Bannon addresses the Supreme Court’s suggestion in Board 
of Regents that amateurism is necessary to preserve college sports, concluding that 
the suggestion is “not based on any factual findings in the trial record and did not 
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the country have been found to be much stronger reasons.187 In essence, 
while NCAA steadfastly asserts it needs amateurism in order to distinguish 
itself, the evidence, some of which comes from the NCAA itself, shows 
that consumers are in large part indifferent to it. 
Ultimately, the NCAA’s distinction between the purchase of loss 
of value and disability insurance is arbitrary and capricious.  While there is 
no particular NCAA bylaw which serves to effectuate this difference,188 a 
court would likely find that the functional effect of the bylaws with regards 
to purchasing loss of value insurance is arbitrary and capricious as it relates 
to the purpose of promoting amateurism and preventing gains on the basis 
of athletic ability, particularly in light of allowing the purchase of extra 
disability insurance.  The NCAA would likely have a difficult time 
showing a rational connection between its ban on loss of value coverage 
and the justification for it when it simultaneously allows student-athletes to 
use the same basis (future earning capacity as a professional athlete) to 
obtain another form of additional insurance.  Producing a satisfactory 
explanation for the vastly different treatment of two very similar issues 
would be a challenge for the NCAA. 
 
2. Protects One Economic Class of Athlete and Not 
Another 
 
On their face, the NCAA’s rules serve to effectively prevent a 
large, substantial class of athletes from protecting themselves from loss of 
value in any way.  The bylaws function such that they prohibit outside 
loans from being secured to pay the policy’s premiums ensuring that only 
athletes whose families possess significant wealth can insure themselves.  
Therefore, student-athletes who, through no fault of their own, do not have 
                                                                                                                                
serve to resolve any disputed issue of law” and is actually “counter to the 
assertions of the NCAA’s own counsel in the case, who stated . . . that the NCAA . 
. . might be able to get more viewers and so on if it had semi-professional clubs 
rather than amateur clubs.” Id. at 999 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
187 Id. at 977–78, 1001. 
188 See NCAA Bylaws, supra note 124. The NCAA’s prohibition is the 
function of three bylaws (16.11.2.1, 16.02.3 and 12.1.2.1.6) working in 
conjunction. Independently, these bylaws serve to justifiably govern and prohibit 
certain activity by student-athletes. Striking down or enjoining these two bylaws 
outright could have wide-sweeping effects in other unrelated areas of college 
athlete regulation. To avoid this problem, a narrowly-tailored injunction would be 
necessary, as discussed further below. 
2015 EVEN I CAN’T COVER ME 549 
 
the financial capacity to purchase the insurance and likely would benefit 
most are unable to protect their future careers.  A subset of college athletes, 
chosen by way of certain criteria, is eligible for an extra benefit while a 
majority of players must go unprotected.  The NCAA provides an extra 
benefit to a portion of its athletes, based solely in familial wealth, out of 
concern for their future earnings and well-being.  The question then 
becomes why is that acceptable but allowing a wider base of athletes to 
protect themselves is unacceptable?  There is no discernible reason why an 
athlete’s eligibility for financial security should be tied to his family’s 
economic situation. 
 
3. Non-Athletes Can Obtain it Freely, but Student-
Athletes Cannot 
 
One of the NCAA Bylaws which works to effectuate the ban on 
loss of value insurance, Bylaw 16.02.3, concerns “extra benefits” received 
by student-athletes.  As part of the definition of what constitutes an “extra 
benefit,” Bylaw 16.02.3 includes an exception that says something is not 
deemed to be an extra benefit if “the same benefit is generally available to 
the institution’s students or their family members or friends or to a 
particular segment of the student-body . . . determined on a basis unrelated 
to athletics ability.”189 An argument against the NCAA’s prohibition would 
be that loss of value insurance is readily available to the rest of student 
body or to others outside the NCAA for reasons unrelated to athletic 
ability. 
While arguing that loss of value coverage is available in general, 
such as in the context of automobile insurance, is likely a losing argument, 
a challenger could narrow the comparison to other physical skill-related 
fields.  For example, assuming they could find a willing insurer, loss of 
value insurance could be obtainable by surgeons, musicians, or other skill-
related professions.  This insurance, which provides the same protection as 
athletic loss of value insurance, is not obtainable by virtue of any athletic 
ability.  Therefore, it would stand to reason that purchasing loss of value 
insurance is not an extra benefit as defined by the NCAA and purchasing it 
does not violate the NCAA Bylaws. 
The counterargument to this position is that the other types of loss 
of value coverage, while similar on their faces, are in no way analogous.  
This promotes a narrow reading of Bylaw 16.02.3’s interpretation of the 
                                                                                                                                
189 See id. at art. 16.02.3 (emphasis added). 
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definition of “loss of value insurance” as it applies to student-athletes.  A 
court would have to determine that the policies purchased are sports-
specific and therefore not available to the general public or other students 
because they are presumably not elite athletes with professional potential.  
Inherent in this interpretation is the determination that “loss of value 
insurance” in this context pertains exclusively to loss of draft position 
coverage, and not the principle of loss of value insurance generally. 
In sum, it can be argued that the NCAA’s restrictions prevent 
athletes from doing something that their families, other students, and the 
general population are free to do.  It is prohibiting an activity in 
contravention of its own bylaws.  This argument, however, is tenuous at 
best, given the likelihood that a court will narrowly interpret the benefit as 
sports-related loss of value insurance and not loss of value coverage 
generally, particularly in light of its deference to the NCAA Bylaws and 
their interpretation.190 
 
D. SUMMARY  
 
It is difficult to predict whether a challenge to the NCAA’s 
prohibition on the purchase of loss of value insurance would be successful.  
The prohibition itself is likely arbitrary and capricious, given that athletes 
can already purchase very similar insurance while securing loans based on 
their earning capacity as athletes.  Alternatively, the bylaw itself seems to 
be contradictory, as loss of value insurance is available to other students 
and non-students in various forms, though the scope of “loss of value 
insurance” would need to be determined.  A student-athlete would appear 
to have a reasonable likelihood of success on either of these two legal 
arguments, and has a chance to earn the right to secure loans to purchase 
loss of value insurance. 
However, overshadowing this entire process is the specter of the 
NCAA’s prominence and courts’ deference to their rulemaking and 
interpretations.  This factor is the wild card in the analysis of any legal 
challenge, as it appears that courts are reluctant to overturn NCAA rules 
except in the most limited circumstances.191 A student-athlete can only 
                                                                                                                                
190 See Mitten & Davis, supra note 164, at 119–28 (discussing courts’ general 
deference to the NCAA and other private athletic bodies when it comes to 
reviewing these organizations’ actions and rules). 
191 See Bloom v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 93 P.3d 621, 624 (Colo. 
App. 2004).  
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hope that the deprivation of his ability to protect himself against the loss of 
millions of dollars is one such circumstance.  
 
IV. POLICY CONCERNS 
 
In addition to the legal grounds noted above, student-athletes could 
advance a number of public policy arguments to support their contention 
that they deserve the opportunity to obtain loss of value coverage.  The 
strength of these arguments in many ways exceeds any legal bases they 
may have in seeking relief. 
 
A. ALLOWING PEOPLE TO PROTECT THEMSELVES 
 
In general, individuals should be allowed to protect themselves if 
they have the means and desire to.  If a person wishes to secure some form 
of protection and said protection is available, he should be free to do so.  
People’s desire to protect themselves against financial ruin and the benefits 
to society of allowing insurance are evidenced by the importance placed on 
making health coverage widely available and how most states require auto 
liability coverage as a requirement for driving.192 Additionally, restricting 
an individual’s ability to purchase insurance cuts against the values of a 
free market and of an individual’s right to contract.  The decision to incur 
debt in order to secure this coverage – in essence, leveraging current 
protection against future earnings – is the right and province of the 
individual student-athlete and not for the NCAA to regulate.  It is generally 
bad public policy to prevent individuals from freely securing protection for 
themselves if they are willing and able. 
 
B. STUDENTS ARE, IN ESSENCE, FORCED TO PLAY IN COLLEGE, 
SO THEY SHOULD BE ABLE TO PROTECT THEMSELVES 
 
The coercive elements of professional sports leagues’ entry rules 
effectively force athletes to participate in collegiate athletics if they wish to 
                                                                                                                                
192 See W.C. Crais III, Annotation, Automobile Liability Insurance: Operator’s 
Policies, 88 A.L.R.2d 995 (1963); see also Motor Vehicle Insurance – Financial 
Responsibility and Required Minimums, 0110 SURVEYS 68 (Thomson Reuters 
2014). 
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pursue a professional career.193 Unable, in many cases, to enter the 
professional ranks immediately after high school and with no viable 
alternative, athletes have nowhere to turn except to NCAA sports.  In light 
of this, it is unfair to then prohibit these athletes from protecting 
themselves.  They are forced to put the earning of any income on hold in 
order to participate in college athletics while simultaneously physically 
putting their bodies (and future earning capacity) at risk.  It is then good 
policy to allow these individuals who, by virtue of rules outside of their 
control, cannot enter the field in which they hope to make a career to obtain 
protection.  Athletes typically have a limited window in which they can 
earn a living194 and forcing them to spend some of this time playing in 
college while also putting their future at risk is unfair and bad public 
policy. 
 
C. IF STUDENT-ATHLETES CANNOT BE COMPENSATED WITH A 
SALARY, THEY SHOULD BE PROTECTED AGAINST LOSING 
FUTURE EARNINGS 
 
Student-athletes are unable to be compensated in any way for their 
contributions to their schools and the NCAA other than by virtue of an 
athletic scholarship.  The rules adopted to ensure this result are fueled by 
the NCAA’s focus on preserving amateurism among its athletes.195 Even if 
                                                                                                                                
193  Athletes in many sports must wait at least one to three years after high 
school before being able to turn pro.  NBA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, 
supra note 5; NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 6. The lack 
of comparable alternatives to NCAA athletics in terms of competitiveness, talent 
level and exposure means that student-athletes who cannot immediately enter the 
professional ranks must turn to the NCAA. 
194 See Dashiell Bennett, The NFL’s Official Spin On Average Career Length 
Is A Joke, BUSINESS INSIDER (Apr. 18, 2011), http://www.businessinsider.com/ 
nfls-spin-average-career-length-2011-4 (citing the average length of an NFL career 
as 3.2 years and discussing the NFL’s contention that the average length is actually 
6 years); Sam Roberts, Just How Long Does the Average Baseball Career Last?, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/15/sports/ 
baseball/15careers.html (citing the average length of a career in MLB to be 5.6 
years); Dave Berri, Why the NBA Players Keep Losing to the Owners, 
FREAKONOMICS (Dec. 6, 2011), http://freakonomics.com/2011/12/06/why-the-nba-
players-keep-losing-to-the-owners/ (citing the average length of a career in the 
NBA to be 4.8 years). 
195 See NCAA Bylaws, supra note 124, at art. 2.9. 
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one concedes that the preservation of amateurism is a reasonable purpose 
and that athletes should not be financially compensated while in school, it 
still stands to reason that they should not be hindered in their post-
collegiate lives.  The effective ban on obtaining financing for loss of value 
insurance essentially prevents athletes from protecting themselves in an 
event – the draft – that occurs post-graduation, or, at the very least, post-
college athletics.   
It could be argued that it is generally bad public policy to prevent 
college athletes from insuring their future economic interests in their own 
athletic ability by purchasing loss of value insurance because unlike issues 
surrounding athlete compensation during their collegiate careers, loss of 
value insurance concerns his compensation after leaving college.  The 
NCAA’s argument that the ability to obtain a loan to pay for such coverage 
is only possible by virtue of their status as an NCAA athlete with 
professional potential is unconvincing, as it is premised on the idea that the 
NCAA owns an athlete’s talent, not the athlete himself.  If an athlete is the 
owner of his own talent and potential, it is unfair to permit an organization 
with no cognizable interest in his future earnings to prevent him from 
protecting himself.  The NCAA has an interest – the preservation of the 
amateurism ideal – in the student-athlete’s talent and potential only while 
he is in college, but not beyond.  Therefore, it is bad public policy to 
prevent a private organization from limiting one of its member’s rights to 
earnings in the future. 
 
D. THE VIABILITY OF E.S.D.I. AND SIMILAR POLICIES IS VERY 
MUCH IN QUESTION 
 
A final public policy argument advanced in favor of permitting the 
obtaining of loss of value insurance is the ineffectiveness of the NCAA’s 
current insurance programs.  As noted above, there have been very few 
payouts under either E.S.D.I., Catastrophic Injury Insurance, or any similar 
private policies.196 The goal of these total disability policies – to protect an 
athlete’s future economic interests – is thwarted by the fact that the 
coverage is becoming somewhat obsolete.  Advances in medical 
technology and procedures have meant that what were once career-ending 
injuries are now just career-postponing ones.197 A torn ACL or rotator cuff 
                                                                                                                                
196 Fixler, supra note 87 (estimating the lack of successful claims through 
permanent total disability policies as “probably less than a dozen”). 
197 Id. 
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in college used to mean that an athlete’s professional career was over.  
Now it simply means surgery, rigorous rehabilitation, and a drop in the 
draft. 
With this new medical reality, total disability policies are unlikely 
to improve their payout rates, thereby frustrating the purposes for which 
they were instituted.  While the recent rise in awareness over head injuries 
in college and professional sports may result in a new wave of career-
ending injuries,198 any increase in this area is unlikely to justify the limited 
scope of total disability coverage. 
Therefore, in order to effectively protect vulnerable student-
athletes, it is good public policy to allow them to procure loss of value 
insurance.  It would provide a more viable alternative because athletes 
would be able to more accurately and efficiently insure themselves against 
financial loss.  The limited conditions under which they can collect on total 
disability policies coupled with their enormous price tags make them cost 
ineffective.  Loss of value coverage allows athletes to guard against a harm 
that, particularly in today’s reality, is more likely to occur than a career-
ending injury.  No other measure can better guard their future interests. 
 
V. REMEDIES 
 
A. MONETARY DAMAGES 
 
Student-athletes could first seek monetary relief from the NCAA or 
its member institutions as compensation.  These damages would only be 
available in cases where the athlete was able to show an actual, already-
suffered injury.  The argument for monetary damages would be that if not 
for the NCAA Bylaws, the athlete could have properly protected himself 
against depreciation in his value.  Therefore, due to the NCAA’s arbitrary 
and capricious adoption of these rules, the athlete was unable to protect 
                                                                                                                                
198 See, e.g., David Piland’s Career Ends Due to Concussions: Houston QB 
Decides To Stop Playing Football, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 8 2013), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/10/08/david-piland-concussions-career-ends-
houston_n_4065436.html; Chris Carlson, Concussions Bring Premature Close to 
Career of Syracuse DE Tyler Marona, SYRACUSE.COM (Oct. 25, 2013), 
http://www.syracuse.com/orangefootball/index.ssf/2013/10/concussions_bring_pre
mature_cl.html; Pete Volk, Utah QB Travis Wilson Out for Season with Possible 
Career-ending Concussion, SB NATION (Nov. 18, 2013), 
http://www.sbnation.com/college-football2013/11/18/5118864/travis-wilson-
injury-utah-concussion.  
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himself and suffered significant financial injury. 
Such a remedy would not be without its issues.  First, there would 
likely be disputes over whether the student-athlete planned on or could 
have afforded the loss of value insurance in the first place.  There will 
undoubtedly be disputes over where the athlete would have been drafted.  
Further, the source of the drop in the draft would surely be contested, as the 
NCAA and the schools could argue that a player fell for any number of 
reasons unrelated to the injury.  Or, in the event that an injury accompanied 
some other potential reason for the drop, there would at least be a debate 
over how much of the fall was attributable to the injury and how much was 
the result of the other event or circumstance.  Regardless, in the event of an 
actual injury, provided he can prove that he intended and could have 
afforded loss of value insurance, courts could award monetary damages to 
student-athletes in amounts consistent with what was lost as a result of not 
having a loss of value insurance policy either through loss of value 
calculation or actuarial analysis. 
 
B. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS 
 
 In the alternative, student-athletes could seek a preliminary 
injunction to prevent the NCAA Bylaws that effectively ban obtaining 
loans to pay for loss of value insurance from being enforced in this context.  
Ultimately, the student-athlete would want to seek a narrowly-tailored 
injunction allowing him to take out loans to purchase loss of value 
insurance and not a blanket injunction against the NCAA Bylaws at issue, 
as the latter could have significant effects beyond the scope of this 
problem.199 
In order to obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must 
establish: (1) “that he is likely to succeed on the merits”;200 (2) “that he is 
likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief”;201 (3) 
“that the balance of equities tips in his favor”;202 and (4) “that an injunction 
                                                                                                                                
199 Enjoining the NCAA Bylaws at issue from being enforced could result in 
substantial impacts in other areas for schools and student athletes, as the intended 
purpose of these rules – to prevent students from obtaining illicit benefits and 
financial gains that jeopardize their amateur status by virtue of their status as 
athletes – is a legitimate one as it applies to most other actions. 
200 Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). 
201 Id. 
202 Id. 
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is in the public interest.”203 An injunction should only be issued when 
essential to protect property rights against injuries that can otherwise not be 
remedied.204 The basis for injunctive relief in federal courts has consistently 
been “irreparable injury and the inadequacy of legal remedies.”205 
 
1. Success on the Merits 
 
The challenging student-athlete would need to demonstrate that his 
claim that the NCAA Bylaws are arbitrary and capricious, with respect to 
the prohibition on loss of value insurance, is likely to succeed on the 
merits.  While it is unclear whether he would successfully be able to prove 
his claim, he could most likely establish a likelihood of success.  The 
NCAA prohibition is possibly arbitrary on its face, particularly in light of 
the exception the NCAA carved out for similar insurance coverage 
(E.S.D.I.), that the prohibition appears to contradict the NCAA’s own rules, 
and that it deprives the student-athletes of a protective measure that is of 
significant impact to their livelihoods.  A court could reasonably find for 
the challenging student-athlete, and therefore his claim is likely to succeed 
on its merits. 
 
2. Irreparable Harm 
 
The challenging student-athlete should be able to demonstrate that 
irreparable harm is likely to occur in the absence of an injunction against 
the NCAA Bylaws.  Because litigation can take several months and years 
while a career-altering injury can occur at any moment, there is a chance 
the athlete’s claim becomes moot before he has a chance to have his day in 
court.  He could suffer the injury, lose millions, and never have an 
opportunity to protect himself.  Furthermore, the athlete cannot abstain 
from playing his sport pending his legal challenge, as that would thwart his 
intentions of entering the professional ranks as pro teams prefer that 
athletes play and develop rather than sit out.  Therefore, because time is of 
great importance in these situations, the student-athlete would be likely to 
suffer irreparable harm should the injunction not be granted. 
 
                                                                                                                                
203 Id. 
204 Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982). 
205 Id. 
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3. Balance of Equities 
 
In balancing the equities, a court would likely come down in favor 
of the athletes.  The impact on the NCAA if the injunction is granted is 
only that they must now monitor the purchase of new insurance by its 
member institutions’ athletes.  The NCAA will likely claim that prohibition 
furthers its interest in preserving amateurism, but the question then 
becomes whether the NCAA’s interest in an ideal trumps the athletes’ real 
need to protect themselves.  For the athletes, the impact of denying the 
injunction is substantial.  They could lose millions of dollars in potential 
earnings while putting themselves at risk for the benefit of the NCAA and 
while unable to play their trade anywhere else.  In weighing the 
consequences for both sides, it is likely that the harm to the student-athletes 
if the injunction is denied far outweighs the harm to the NCAA if it is 
granted. 
 
4. Public Interest 
 
The public interest would likely be served by granting this 
injunction.  It is generally good public policy to allow individuals to, if they 
so choose, take responsibility and protect themselves for the benefit of 
society.  An additional policy concern specifically affecting athletes is the 
fact that they have a limited window in which they can earn a living from 
their athletic talent and it is in the public interest to allow an individual to 
protect their ability to earn a living.  The NCAA draws no readily apparent 
benefit from preventing these individuals from protecting themselves.  
Therefore, in light of these circumstances, it appears to be sound public 
policy that absent a justifiable reason, college athletes should be able to 
protect themselves and contract with whomever they choose to achieve this 
goal.  For these reasons, the public interest is likely served by granting a 
preliminary injunction. 
 
C. PERMANENT INJUNCTION 
 
Once the student-athlete’s challenge proceeds to court, he could 
seek remedy in the form of a permanent injunction.  Each of the four 
elements required for a preliminary injunction would apply, as would the 
same arguments and rationales, except for a few slight differences.206 The 
                                                                                                                                
206 Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 544 n.12 (1987). 
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first element of a preliminary injunction, a likelihood of success on the 
merits, is replaced by actual success on the merits, which would be 
demonstrated by the outcome of the trial.207 Just like the preliminary 
injunction, any permanent injunction would need to be narrowly tailored to 
achieve the student-athletes’ goal of being able to obtain loans to purchase 
loss of value insurance without violating NCAA rules.  A blanket 
injunction against the bylaws in question could have a significant impact 
beyond just insurance concerns.208 
 
VI. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
 
 Addressed in this section are several suggestions for how the 
NCAA could go about implementing loss of value coverage for its student-
athletes.  While no one solution is perfect, each is a step in the right 
direction toward protecting the athletes.  If any proposal is adopted, the 
NCAA could always revise it after some time to better meet the goals of 
providing the coverage. 
 
A. INCORPORATE LOSS OF VALUE INTO THE CURRENTLY-
EXISTING E.S.D.I. STRUCTURE 
 
 The first proposed solution for implementing a loss of value 
program is to automatically include it under E.S.D.I. coverage.  Obviously 
this would require that the NCAA renegotiate its deals with Bank of 
America, N.A., and HCC Insurance Holdings, Inc. regarding the provision 
of the already-existing E.S.D.I. coverage, changing it from strictly a 
permanent total disability policy to one that includes a loss of value 
provision.  The resulting premiums would be higher, as there is now an 
additional provision for a coverage that is more likely to be paid out, but 
the added benefit would be worth it.  The presumption here would be that 
most athletes willing to obtain expensive E.S.D.I. coverage would be 
interested in spending a little extra in order to protect against diminished 
earnings.   
                                                                                                                                
207 Id. 
208 See NCAA Bylaws, supra 124. The NCAA Bylaws at issue affect activities 
and actions that are far beyond the scope of loss of value insurance. For this 
reason, it is crucial that any injunctive relief be narrowly tailored to avoid 
enjoining any legitimate effects of the rules. 
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 The problem with this solution is that it does not provide loss of 
value insurance to all athletes with professional potential who may want it.  
Because E.S.D.I. is offered to a limited pool of student-athletes, access to 
loss of value coverage would also be limited.  To remedy this, E.S.D.I. 
would need to broaden its eligibility requirements.209 While going this route 
may prove to be a bigger overhaul than the NCAA and its partners are 
interested in performing, relaxed requirements for E.S.D.I. eligibility, 
combined with the automatic inclusion of a loss of value provision, would 
be an effective solution to the current problem. 
 
B. EXPAND E.S.D.I. AND PROVIDE AN OPTION TO PURCHASE 
ADDITIONAL COVERAGE 
 
 A slight variation on the previous suggestion is to provide loss of 
value coverage as an option, rather than as included, in E.S.D.I. coverage.  
This route also requires the relaxing of the eligibility requirements for 
E.S.D.I. in order to ensure that all or most who want coverage would have 
access to it.  It would also, like the first option, require that HCC Insurance 
Holdings, Inc., be amenable to creating loss of value coverage.  Implicit in 
the adoption of this option would be an express permission to obtain 
outside financing to secure loss of value coverage, which the NCAA 
currently does not permit,210 because if athletes need loans to pay for 
expensive E.S.D.I. coverage, they will also need it for loss of value 
coverage. 
Provided both of these conditions are met, the NCAA could then 
give student-athletes the choice to obtain additional loss of value coverage 
should they want it.  Athletes could presumably obtain the policy at a rate 
lower than the market average, just as the NCAA and its partners can 
provide E.S.D.I. coverage more cheaply than private insurers.211 The result 
would be freedom on the part of the student-athletes to choose for 
themselves whether they want to take on additional debt in order to 
adequately protect themselves.  If adopted, this proposal would perhaps be 
                                                                                                                                
209 See generally Joseph Stuart Knight, Blown Coverage: Tackling Problems 
with the NCAA’s Exceptional Student-Athlete Disability Insurance Program, 1 
MISS. SPORTS L. REV. 157 (2012) (discussing why the NCAA should make 
changes to its E.S.D.I. program, including providing for greater coverage for more 
athletes, and how it could go about doing so). 
210 Zola, supra note 38. 
211 Wong & Deubert, supra note 13, at 510. 
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the most complete solution to the issue. 
 
C. CREATE A LESSER ADDITIONAL TOTAL DISABILITY 
COVERAGE THAT INCORPORATES A LOSS OF VALUE 
PROVISION 
 
 A second proposed solution is an even larger overhaul of the 
current system, and may prove to be the most difficult to implement.  If 
accomplished, however, it would address the concerns with the first and 
second solutions regarding the lack of access to the coverage for most 
student-athletes with professional prospects.  Here, the NCAA would need 
to negotiate with its current insurer, HCC Insurance Holdings, Inc., or 
another insurer to provide a lesser version of E.S.D.I.  The new plan would 
provide less financial coverage at the cost of more affordable premiums 
and would contain a loss of value provision.  The creation of a lesser 
disability policy is necessary because loss of value policies usually require 
that a total disability policy also be obtained.212 The offer of a less inclusive 
and cheaper disability policy would fulfill this requirement, while also 
being affordable to those student-athletes who are less certain of their 
professional prospects. 
 The obvious hurdle facing this solution is finding an insurer willing 
to offer the program.  More research would need to be done on the viability 
of this solution, but if it were offered, it could be of significant benefit to 
those student-athletes not quite eligible for E.S.D.I. coverage that wish to 
protect their professional financial interests. 
 
D. CREATE AN EXCEPTION TO THE NCAA BYLAWS THAT 
ALLOWS ATHLETES TO SECURE LOANS TO PAY FOR THEIR 
OWN LOSS OF VALUE POLICIES 
 
A final proposed solution is to simply create an explicit exception 
in the NCAA Bylaws that permits student-athletes to obtain outside 
financing to privately purchase insurance.  Since the NCAA Bylaws state 
that any benefit not expressly authorized is forbidden,213 the NCAA would 
need to establish an exception for this purpose.  They have already done so 
through their development of the E.S.D.I. program itself, going so far as to 
help secure the loans themselves through a deal with Bank of America, 
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N.A.214 
 The ultimate effect of this proposal, however, would likely drive 
student-athletes away from the NCAA-offered E.S.D.I. program altogether 
and toward private insurers, where they would likely face much higher 
premiums.215 The reason for this is that loss of value provisions are not 
typically offered independently and usually must be part of a total disability 
policy.216 Therefore, if a student-athlete purchases E.S.D.I., he will not be 
able to independently purchase loss of value insurance from another insurer 
without also obtaining disability coverage from that insurer.  Unless the 
student-athlete seeks double coverage and is willing to pay two premiums, 
he would be best suited to simply go with the outside insurer. 
 
VII. IMPACT OF IMPLEMENTING LOSS OF VALUE INSURANCE 
 
A. IMPACT FOR THE NCAA 
 
 The impact on the NCAA, should loss of value policies be allowed, 
is likely to be minimal.  The most direct cost to the organization would be 
that associated with monitoring and keeping track of the purchase of these 
policies.  It may lead to an increased need for oversight of boosters, agents 
and other third parties as they relate to the student-athletes.  Overall, 
however, it should not cost the NCAA much in terms of time or money, 
particularly if it is wound into its already existing insurance programs. 
 The implementation of a loss of value policy may actually benefit 
the NCAA in two ways.  First, it could increase athletes’ incentives to stay 
in school and complete their degrees rather than force them to seek to cash 
in as early as possible.217 Many athletes look to turn pro as soon as they 
become eligible due to the need for financial stability and concerns over 
injuries.218 Having available protection may alleviate some students’ fears 
and allow them to stay in school longer, thereby allowing the NCAA to 
benefit from their athletic success while strengthening the notion that the 
importance of education is paramount. 
The second benefit to the NCAA could come in the form of 
reducing some of the vitriol over its failure to adequately compensate its 
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student-athletes for the financial contributions their athletic ability makes to 
the NCAA and its member institutions.  The NCAA might not be willing to 
pay its players, but granting them increased freedom in the ways in which 
they can protect themselves during their collegiate careers would be a step 
in the right direction toward showing they care about their players’ well-
being.  While creating some form of loss of value insurance is unlikely to 
completely quiet those criticisms, it would have some positive effect. 
 
B. IMPACT FOR NCAA STUDENT-ATHLETES 
 
 The most substantial impact on the athletes is obvious – they would 
be able to effectively protect themselves, or, at the very least, have the 
option of doing so.  Those students who leave school early in order to 
capitalize on and maximize the economic benefits of their athletic talents 
may feel less pressure to do so.219 Students who wish to return to school for 
their junior or senior year in order to complete their degrees can do so 
knowing they are protected in the event of a serious but not career-ending 
injury. 
 An ancillary effect would be new concerns over the proper path to 
choose in securing loss of value coverage.  It would become another factor 
for student-athletes to weigh, as decisions about the amount of coverage, 
the size of the loans and whether to purchase it at all would need to be 
considered. 
 
C. IMPACT FOR THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY 
 
 The consequences for the insurance industry would likely be 
significant in this area, as dramatically expanding the market, which is 
currently very limited,220 would create incentive for more insurers to offer 
these policies.  The pool of potential insureds would grow exponentially 
overnight, allowing companies already featuring these policies to offer 
more of them and other underwriters currently not in the market to enter the 
market.  Lower premiums would likely result because insurers could better 
spread the risks of these policies and purchasers would have more options 
available to them.  Furthermore, the increased frequency of the issuance 
would allow insurers to better tailor the policies to effectively protect the 
athletes while providing maximum value to the insurers. 
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VIII. CONCERNS REGARDING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF LOSS 
OF VALUE POLICIES 
 
A. THE MORAL HAZARD PROBLEM 
 
 The largest concern regarding the student-athletes and the 
implementation of loss of value coverage is the moral hazard problem.  The 
belief here would be that athletes, if covered by a loss of value policy, 
would be free to take more chances as collegiate players because the 
insurance coverage protects them if anything goes wrong.  While the 
concern may be legitimate, it is unlikely that athletes will suddenly become 
more reckless as a result of having a policy.  For many of these athletes, 
professional sports are their meal ticket, and they already take risks and 
routinely put their bodies on the line while playing for their college teams.  
This approach stems from a belief at the core of sports – the concept of 
“team” – which encourages giving full effort in order to help your team 
succeed.  The motivation behind going full bore can also be personal – to 
impress professional scouts.  Either way, athletes already take chances with 
their bodies by virtue of being on the field.  The presence of a loss of value 
policy is unlikely to increase their risk taking. 
There will always be exceptions, but the vast majority of athletes 
see their bodies as the means through which they will earn a living.  It 
would be incredibly shortsighted for them to risk their long-term health in 
hopes of a quick cash out.  Furthermore, the policies themselves work to 
prevent these kinds of issues.  The fact that the policies usually do not pay 
out full value lost in a draft fall, but only a percentage of it, works to ensure 
that realizing full draft potential is the more lucrative option for the athlete. 
 
B. INCREASED LITIGATION STEMMING FROM THE POLICIES 
 
Because athletes would be far more likely to collect on these 
policies as opposed to catastrophic or total disability coverage,221 there is 
likely to be an increase in litigation.  It may be difficult in some 
circumstances to discern whether an athlete’s drop in the draft was based 
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on an injury suffered during the collegiate season or an off-the-field issue.  
For example, an insurer may claim it was a student-athlete’s legal troubles 
that caused teams to choose him later, while the athlete will claim it was 
the injury.  There is also the problem of proof, as both sides’ contentions 
would be nearly impossible to prove either way, absent a poll of each 
professional team as to exactly why they passed on that specific player.  It 
is easy to see how this process could spiral out of control. 
 
C. LACK OF PARTICIPATION IN THE PROGRAM 
 
One concern is that even if loss of value coverage were offered, 
there is no real demand for this type of protection.  In other words, this is a 
solution without a problem.  While this contention may have some merit, it 
may be too difficult to tell whether or not this demand exists, due in large 
part to the fact that it is currently prohibited.  It is impossible to know what 
the interest would be in an environment in which student-athletes were free 
to pursue this type of coverage. 
While it is very likely that a select few athletes would purchase 
these types of policies, this does not mean that there is no desire for them.  
E.S.D.I. coverage was instituted despite the same concern.  E.S.D.I. is 
targeted to a very specific subset of collegiate athletes, yet it remains viable 
and enrollment is consistent, despite its low payout totals.222 Loss of value 
policies would presumably pay out substantially more often than total 
disability ones, thereby increasing their attractiveness among players.  Even 
with a relatively low enrollment, the importance of the coverage is still 
substantial, given that the losses being insured are often in the eight-figure 
range. 
 
D. FINANCIAL BURDEN 
 
 One legitimate concern would be that the high cost of these 
policies and their appeal may cause athletes for whom the price of the 
coverage may be outside their means to pursue them.  It is easy to imagine 
an athlete, projected in the mid-to-low rounds of his sport’s professional 
draft, securing an expensive policy through a costly loan, and then 
subsequently failing to be selected in that draft due to circumstances other 
than injury (i.e., off-the-field issues).  The athlete would still be on the 
hook to repay the expensive loan, but would not be able to collect on the 
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policy, thereby incurring a potentially crippling amount of debt.  While the 
concern here is certainly foreseeable, the NCAA should not use it as a 
rationale for denying availability.  It is the province of each individual to 
decide for himself as to whether he wants to risk incurring substantial debt 
to protect his future interests.   
 
IX. CONCLUSION 
 
In conclusion, the NCAA’s prohibition on loss of value insurance 
leaves its student-athletes unable to cover themselves.  The organization’s 
current bylaws and rules as they pertain to insurance are flawed.  Although 
the NCAA provides viable insurance options, it fails to allow its student-
athletes to protect themselves in an area in which there is an increasing 
need for protection – loss of monetary value due to lower draft position.  
Advances in medical technology and procedures have substantially 
decreased the rate of occurrence for career-ending injuries, thereby 
decreasing the viability of the NCAA’s current total disability insurance 
programs.  Further, it is a general principle that individuals should be 
allowed to protect themselves if they have the means and desire to do so, 
yet the NCAA disallows this.  If student-athletes, by virtue of current 
professional draft rules, are essentially forced to play one to three years of 
collegiate sports and risk their physical and financial livelihood, they 
should be permitted to protect themselves.  Whatever the outcome of the 
ongoing debate over paying college athletes,223 it is clear that even if 
student-athletes should not be allowed to gain something from their 
participation in collegiate sports, they should, at the very least, be allowed 
to avoid losing anything from it.   
A legal challenge to the NCAA over this prohibition will likely be 
successful, provided the challenger can overcome the traditional high level 
of deference courts give to the NCAA.  Monetary damages would be 
difficult to obtain, as they would require an athlete to suffer an injury 
beforehand.  Student-athletes would be better served seeking injunctive 
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relief that permits them to obtain financing to purchase expensive loss of 
value policies.   
The NCAA could implement this coverage in a number of ways, 
either as the result of a court decree or as a result of its own determination, 
ranging from providing it themselves to simply creating a rule that allows 
student-athletes to seek it privately.  Such a move by the NCAA would not 
be without its consequences and concerns but is ultimately necessary given 
the substantial risks for student-athletes in its absence.  While the market 
for such coverage is somewhat limited, it remains necessary due to the fact 
that there are millions of dollars at stake for hundreds of young men and 
women.  For now, though, when it comes to securing their future earnings, 
student-athletes are finding that they cannot cover themselves. 
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